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I. INTRODUCTION
Experts have called an appellate brief’s summary of the
argument section “the most important part of a brief,” 1 its
“structural centerpiece,”2 and “your first serious opportunity to
argue the merits of your appeal.”3 Two theories, framing theory
and priming theory, help explain why the summary is so
important. Framing theorists define a frame as a mental structure
that provides a lens through which a recipient will “locate,
perceive, identify, and label” an experience.4 The way a point is
framed affects what readers focus on when forming their
opinions.5 A similar concept, priming theory,6 holds that exposing
* Judith D. Fischer is a professor of law emeritus at the University of
Louisville’s Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. She thanks Professor Ariana
Levinson for her insightful comments on an earlier draft and Robin Rice and
Sunnye Bush-Sawtelle for their excellent research assistance.
1 Interview with Justice Clarence Thomas, in Interviews with Supreme
Court Justices, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 99, 113 (2010); see also ANTONIN
SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER 80 (2008) (stating that for many judges, “the
summary of the argument [is] the single most important part of the brief.”)
2 RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 184 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting former Loyola Law School dean and
former Supreme Court clerk David Burcham).
3 MAYER BROWN LLP, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE 331 (2008).
4 E.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON ORGANIZATION
OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974) (stating that frames provide “schemata of
interpretation”).
5 James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?,
63 J. POL. 1041, 1043 (2001).
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a reader to chosen information “plants a seed in the brain.” 7
Because the summary of the argument appears near the beginning
of a brief, it allows the legal advocate to take advantage of both
framing and priming to begin to convince the Court. Thus, it’s a
mistake for an advocate to treat the section as an afterthought.8
The United States Supreme Court’s rules require that a brief
contain a summary of the argument section, 9 as do the federal
rules10 and those of some states.11 And because the section can
affect a court’s thinking early, some experts advise including it
even if it is not required.12 Judges, lawyers, and law professors
have offered plentiful observations about the section, 13 but the
sources are short on specifics about what makes an effective
summary.
In this article, I first examine what experts have written
about the importance of the summary of the argument section and
what makes an effective one. I then go beyond the generalities and
examine some actual summaries of the argument from United
States Supreme Court briefs. Many were written by noted
Supreme Court advocates or by the Solicitor General’s office,
which is known for its outstanding advocacy.14 The summaries
introduced arguments on such controversial topics as affirmative
action, gay marriage, and the separation of church and state. I
6 Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the
Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 307
(2010).
7 Id. at 306, 307 (citing E. TORY HIGGINS, KNOWLEDGE ACTIVATION:
ACCESSIBILITY, APPLICABILITY, AND SALIENCE, IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 133, 134 (E. Tory Huggins & Arie W.
Kruglanski eds, 1996).
8 Interview with Justice Samuel Alito, in Interviews with Supreme Court
Justices, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 169, 178 (2010) (stating that writers
who take the summary lightly have missed an opportunity); Carter G.
Phillips, Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court, 15 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 177, 184 (1998) (noting that some lawyers spend too little time on the
summary of the argument).
9 SUP. CT. R. 24 (1) (h).
10 F.R. APP. P. 28 (a) (7).
11 E.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210 (b) (4); IND. R. APP. P. 46 (A) (7); NEV. R. APP.
P. 28 (A) (8); PA. R. APP. P. 2111 (a) (6).
12 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 183 (1992) (stating that “the good brief writer
will consider [the summary of the argument] mandatory”); see also URSULA
BENTELE ET AL., APPELLATE ADVOCACY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 333 (5th
ed. 2012) (stating that many practitioners include the section “in the wellfounded belief that busy judges find them useful.”).
13 E.g., Interview with Justice Samuel Alito, supra note 8, at 178 (advising
that the section should be self-contained); Robert E. Crotty, 50 Writing Tips
for Commercial Lawyers, 58 PRAC. LAW. 45, 52 (2012) (stating that the section
should “have impact”); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
APPELLATE ADVOCACY 189 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that the section can “present
a ‘holistic’ picture of the case.”).
14 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Friedman Lecture in Appellate Advocacy, 23
FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 1 (2013) (stating, “[t]here is no better, or more successful,
appellate practice group than the Office of the Solicitor General.”).
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analyze characteristics of these summaries, including their
opening and closing lines, in order to shed some light on this
important component of an appellate brief.

II. EXPERTS’ VIEWS ABOUT THE SUMMARY OF THE
ARGUMENT SECTION
Experts have noted that many judges read the summary of
the argument early in their review of a brief in order to get a feel
for the case. Judge Ruggero Aldisert observed that after the
appellant’s issue statement and the trial court’s opinion, appellate
judges generally turn to each side’s summary of the argument,15
which “will likely create the first, and perhaps last, impression of
the Court toward the legal merits of the client’s case.” 16 Justice
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner counseled, “[D]on’t omit this
part—and give it the attention it deserves.”17 And Justice Samuel
Alito stated simply, “It’s the first thing I read.”18
Two purposes are commonly identified for the summary
section. The first is to inform the judge about the content of the
brief.19 Judges do not want to read a mystery story,20 so the
summary should provide an overview21 or “road map” of the
argument section.22 Because the summary may function as a
15 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 183; see also Robert Baldock et al., What
Appellate Advocates Seek from Appellate Judges and What Appellate Judges
Seek from Appellate Advocates: Panel Two, 31 N.M. L. REV. 265, 268 (2001)
(stating that Judge Carlos Lucero first reads the statement of the issues and
then the summary of the argument).
16 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 184 (quoting former Loyola Law School dean
and former Supreme Court clerk David Burcham).
17 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 80; see also Bryan J. Pattison,
Writing to Persuade, 24 UTAH B.J. 10, 12 (2011) (quoting Judge Gregory Orme
of the Utah Court of Appeals as saying lawyers who slight the summary miss
an opportunity to “‘pre-sell’ their argument”). But see Interview with Justice
Antonin Scalia, in Interviews with Supreme Court Justices, 13 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 51, 74 (2010) (stating that Justice Scalia often skips the
summary of the argument and that its value is mainly to refresh his memory
about a brief he has already read.).
18 Interview with Justice Samuel Alito, supra note 8, at 169, 178.
19 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 184; BENTELE ET AL., supra note 12, at 333;
LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., JUST BRIEFS 116 (2d ed. 2008).
20 ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 184.
21 CATHY GLASER ET AL., THE LAWYER’S CRAFT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL ANALYSIS, WRITING, RESEARCH, AND ADVOCACY 377 (2002); see also
MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 3, at 331 (2008) (stating that the summary of
the argument “serves as a roadmap”); MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR,
FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 456 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that the summary is an opportunity to present an overview); Dan Schweitzer,
Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 5 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 540 (2003) (stating that the summary “provides
the Court with a roadmap to your brief.”).
22 BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 189; see also BENTELE ET AL., supra note 12,
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memory aid if some time has passed, 23 an advocate might write it
as if the judge will read only that section. 24
The summary has a second purpose: to capture the court’s
attention and begin to convince it to rule for the writer’s side. 25
The preliminary parts of the brief, such as the question presented
and the statement of the case, are expected to be somewhat
objective.26 But in the summary of the argument, counsel can
switch to overt persuasion. The summary section can “be both
more dramatic and more argumentative” than the introductory
parts of the brief.27 It “provides the ‘flavor’ of the case,”28 piquing
the judge’s interest before the more thoroughly developed
argument section.29 Here counsel can introduce the brief’s theme, 30
priming the judges to see the rest of the brief in a chosen light,31
and “control[ling] the ‘feel’ [they] get from a case.”32 Accordingly,
the summary should “go beyond mere assertion,” and be
appealing, not dry.33 As Judge Aldisert advised, “You’d better sell
the sizzle as soon as possible; the steak can wait.”34
Ways to sell the sizzle include engaging the court’s emotions 35
or presenting a strong logical argument 36 based on the law. And
vivid language persuades more powerfully than heavy, lifeless
prose.37 Livening up the language might mean saying a stock price
at 333 (recommending that the summary should ordinarily follow the
organization of the brief).
23 STEPHEN SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 730 (10th ed.
2013); Christian A. Fisanick, Travelogue of Appellate Practice, 23 No. 4
Litigation, sum. 1997, at 49, 50.
24 Pattison, supra note 17, at 12; see also Crotty, supra note 13, at 52
(stating that if the court reads only the summary it should be able to
understand the arguments).
25 BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 189.
26 See, e.g., id. (discussing the different sections of an appellate brief).
27 Id. at 190.
28 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 183; see also Stanchi, supra note 6, at 310
(stating that the summary can prime the reader’s viewpoint on the case).
29 Pattison, supra note 17, at 10, 12 (quoting Judge Gregory Orne); see also
Crotty, supra note 13, at 52 (stating that the summary of the argument
“should have impact”).
30 Stanchi, supra note 6, at 312; see also Eva M. Guzman, Practical
Considerations: Seeking Review in a Court of Last Resort, 30 FAM. ADVOC.,
spr. 2014, at 42 (stating that the summary of the argument should present the
‘hook’ or theme of the case).
31 Stanchi, supra note 6, at 310.
32 Id.
33 FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 83
(rev’d ed., Christopher T. Lutz & William Pannill, eds., 2004).
34 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 152 (italics omitted).
35 Anna Hemingway, Making Effective Use of Practitioners’ Briefs in the
Law School Curriculum, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 417, 428 (2010); Stanchi,
supra note 6, at 324.
36 Hemingway, supra note 35, at 428; Stanchi, supra note 6, at 330.
37 See ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S
TOP ADVOCATES 188 (2d ed. 2014) (referring to a quotation made by Gerry
Spence).
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“plunged” instead of “fell,” or that a party “heeded” a point instead
of “took [it] into consideration.”38 Such verbs can sharpen ideas
and engage the reader’s emotions through imagery. 39
Experts agree that the summary should be short, 40 without
excessive detail.41 Because the table of contents and the point
headings also provide an overview, a lengthy summary of the
argument may irritate a judge by seeming repetitive. 42 Various
experts have advised including only a few paragraphs, 43 or
limiting the summary to a single page,44 two pages,45 or five to ten
percent of the argument’s length.46 They also advise keeping
citations to a minimum or, if possible, omitting them entirely. 47 Of
course, if a governing authority is mentioned, it must be cited. 48
The summary should not be a simple digest of the argument
section.49 Nor should it simply repeat the brief’s point headings.

Id. at 191. For Guberman’s list of “50 zinger verbs,” see id. at 198.
Guberman’s list of “zinger verbs” includes besiege, etch, pluck, slash, and
strike. Id. at 198-99,
40 E.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 441 (5th ed.
2006) (stating, “[y]ou must keep it short”); Anna Hemingway, Making Effective
Use of Practitioners’ Briefs in the Law School Curriculum, 22 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 417, 428 (stating that summaries of the argument can be brief, “even in
landmark cases”); David Mills, Writing the Holistic Brief: Making It More
Than the Summary of Its Parts, 60 FED. L., Aug. 2013, 58, 58 (stating that the
summary should be kept short).
41 BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 191; see also OATES ET AL., supra note 19, at
117 (stating that counsel should avoid writing too much).
42 CALLEROS, supra note 40, at 441; see also Schweitzer, supra note 21, at
541 (stating that the summary should not be “superficial or redundant”).
43 RICHARD NEUMANN & KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL WRITING 326 (7th ed. 2013).
44 BENTELE, et al., supra note 12, at 333; Guzman, supra note 30, at 42;
Mills, supra note 40, at 58.
45 OATES ET AL., supra note 19, at 117.
46 TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 21, at 456; see also MAYER BROWN LLP,
supra note 3, at 331 (stating that for appellate briefs, the summary of the
argument should be no more than two to four pages); SHAPIRO ET AL., supra
note 23, at 730 (stating that the summary of the argument should be about
two to four pages, and not more than ten percent of the brief’s length).
47 BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 192 (stating that the summary “need not
contain numerous citations to authority”); MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 3,
at 331 (stating that most citations should be omitted, but that a dispositive
precedent or fact should be cited); OATES ET AL., supra note 19, at 117
(advising that citations to authority be kept to a minimum); Judge Patricia
Millett, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, panelist at Legal
Writing Institute Conference (July 1, 2014) (advising brief writers to try to
eliminate citations from the summary of the argument).
48 MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 3, at 331; see also GLASER ET AL., supra
note 21, at 337 (stating that the summary should include “minimal citation,”
citing only to a controlling statute or case).
49 Phillips, supra note 8, at 184 (stating that it is a “terrible mistake” to
write a digest of the argument section and use it as the summary of the
argument.)
38
39
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The federal rules state that explicitly, 50 and most of the judges in
one study agreed.51 Repeating the headings wastes valuable space
and can seem redundant.52 Instead, counsel should write
something fresher.
Some suggest writing the summary of the argument last,
after the argument section is prepared.53 That way, counsel can
ensure that it really does reflect the substance of the argument yet
presents a fresh take on it.54
The summaries discussed below show how twenty lawyers
applied, or sometimes ignored, the experts’ guidance.

III. THE SUMMARIES OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SELECTED
SUPREME COURT BRIEFS
To examine lawyers’ practices in writing summaries of the
argument, I chose merit briefs from ten relatively recent United
States Supreme Court cases,55 for a total of twenty briefs, some
written by well-known advocates. I computed the numbers of
words and citations in the summaries and noted whether they
were divided into subsections. Then, because the opening and
closing in a piece of discourse are recognized as major positions of
emphasis, I specifically examined that language.
The quality of a summary of the argument cannot be fairly
judged by whether the writer’s side won the case, because many
other factors, including the state of the law, the record below, and
the judge’s viewpoint, can affect the outcome. Still, because
readers may be interested to know how the Court ruled in the
selected cases, I include that information.
Some briefs include an introduction56 not required by the
50 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(c); see also David Lewis, 2003 New England
Appellate Judicial Survey, 29 VT. B.J. 41, 41 (2003) (stating that the summary
should do more than repeat the point headings).
51 Lewis, supra note 50, at 41 (reporting judges’ opinions that the summary
should not just repeat the point headings).
52 NEUMANN ET AL., supra note 43, at 326; see also MAYER BROWN LLP,
supra note 3, at 331 (stating that the summary “should do more than simply
repeat the headnotes found in the table of contents.”).
53 TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 21, at 456 (stating that the summary “will be
the last substantive part of the brief the advocate writes”); see also OATES ET
AL., supra note 19, at 115 (suggesting that the advocate prepare one draft of
the summary before writing the argument and a second version afterward).
54 Crotty, supra note 13, at 52 (advising the advocate to write the summary
last, because “[y]ou cannot effectively summarize your argument until you
finally know what your argument is.”); Phillips, supra note 8, at 184 (stating
that writing the summary last will help the advocate to “avoid rehashing the
argument”).
55 See infra Table A (listing the ten cases).
56 E.g., Brief for Respondents at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3173 at *1
(showing the use of an introductory section). Other briefs include an
argumentative “statement” in addition to the summary of the argument
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rules, near the beginning of the brief and before the summary of
the argument. This article does not analyze those extra sections
but focuses instead on the required summary of the argument
section.

A. The Lengths, Numbers of Citations, and Structures of
the Selected Summaries
Although the effectiveness of summaries of the argument
cannot be determined through a formulaic analysis, some of their
characteristics can be quantified. In light of experts’ advice to keep
the summary short and to limit citations, I noted the summaries’
word counts and numbers of citations. I also noted whether the
summaries were divided into subparts.
When the ten selected cases were decided, the word limit for
United States Supreme Court briefs was 15,000.57 Lawyers tend to
use most of those words. In a sampling of six briefs analyzed
here,58 the lowest total number of words was 14,227. 59 The lengths
of the twenty summaries are shown in Table A: Statistics from
Selected Summaries.

section. E.g., Brief for Respondents at 1-4, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10–277), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 247 at *8
(showing the use of an argumentative statement).
57 SUP. CT. R. 33(1) (g).
58 Brief for Petitioner, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345); Brief for
Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345); Brief for Petitioner,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144); Brief for
Respondent, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144); Brief for
Petitioner, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696);
Brief for Respondent, Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696).
59 Brief for Petitioner, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345).
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Case

Brief for

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013)
Fisher
Hollingsworth
v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013)
Hollingsworth
Kelo v. City of New
London, Conn., 545
U.S. 469 (2005)
Kelo
Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001)
Kyllo
McCreary County, Ky.
v. ACLU of Ky., 545
U.S. 844 (2005)
McCreary County
McCutcheon v. FEC,
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)
McCutcheon
Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative
Action, 134 S. Ct.
1623 (2014)
Schuette
United
States
v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460
(2010)
United
States
v.
Stevens
Town of Greece, N.Y.
v. Galloway, 134 S.
Ct. 1811 (2014)
Galloway
Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
Van Orden

Petitioner

1,508

Respondent
Petitioner

1,000
662

2
5

Yes
Yes

Respondent
Petitioner

850
503

8
0

Yes
No

Respondent
Petitioner

734
903

8
5

No
No

Respondent
Petitioner

945
632

1
4

Yes
No

Respondent
Appellant

912
761

7
1

No
No

Appellee
Petitioner

505
505

1
5

Yes
Yes

Respondent
Petitioner

870
660

5
0

No
Yes

Respondent

679

1

No

1,107

8

Yes

Respondent
Petitioner

749
874

3
7

Yes
No

Respondent

438

2

No

Petitioner

Number
of words
in the
summary
of the
argument

[48:991

Number of
sources cited
(other than a
governing
constitutional
provision or
statute)
6

Whether
the
summary
was divided
into
subsections

Table A: Statistics from Selected Summaries

No
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Table A shows that the authors of the twenty selected briefs
followed the advice to keep their summaries short. The summaries
averaged 789 words, with the petitioners averaging slightly more,
at 811, than the respondents, at 767. This is about 5% of the
allotted word count, well within the suggested 5% to 10% limit
that commentators often suggest. 60 Even the longest summary,61
at 1,508 words, fell very near the 10% limit.
The lawyers also kept their citations to a minimum. The
fewest citations appeared in two summaries: the petitioner’s in the
Kelo eminent domain case, which mentioned only the governing
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,62 and the
petitioner’s in United States v. Stevens, which mentioned only the
governing First Amendment and the statute at issue. 63 As the
above Table shows, four other summaries included only one
citation. The respondent’s summary in the Kelo case included the
greatest number of citations: seven cases and one statute.
Eleven of the summaries did not have subparts, but nine did
include numbered or lettered subdivisions. Dividing the prose into
subparts risks breaking up the flow of the prose, but some
advocates do like that approach.64 In the summaries selected for
this article, for example, noted advocates Patricia Millett 65 and
Erwin Chemerinsky66 did not use subdivisions, but Theodore
Olson67 and Gregory Garre68 did.

B. The Opening Lines
Rhetoricians explain that the beginning of a unit of discourse
is a key position of emphasis. 69 That applies especially to the
See supra note 46, and accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner at 18, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345).
62 Brief for Petitioners at 9, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (No. 04–108).
63 Brief for the United States at 7-10, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010) (No. 08–769).
64 See GUBERMAN, supra note 37, at 13 (stating that “[t]he top advocates
love numbered lists.”).
65 See Brief for Respondent at 11-13, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08–
769).
66 See Brief for Petitioner at 6-9, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(No. 03-1500).
67 See Brief for Respondents at 13-16, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013) (No. 12–144).
68 See Brief for Respondents at 18-22, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11–345).
69 E.g., JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: TEN LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE
103 (9th ed. 2007) (identifying the first sentence of a passage as a stress
position).
60
61
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summary of the argument,70 because judges and their clerks are
busy and want the summary to tell them immediately what the
case is about.71 An advocate may accomplish this by beginning the
summary of the argument with a workmanlike statement like this:
“I. FELA provides that a rail worker may recover damages for any
harm ‘resulting in whole or in part from’ the employer's
negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 51.”72 This sentence does alert the court to
the topic of the case. But by opening with an acronym, 73 including
a quotation, and ending with a citation, the sentence is long on
numbers and short on punch. Instead of cumbersome wording that
“muck[s] up” the opening,74 a pithier sentence would be more
engaging.75
The following openings from the twenty selected summaries
of the argument show the lawyers’ varied techniques for priming
the Court to agree with their sides.
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin was an equal
protection case in which the petitioner alleged that she was
unfairly denied admission to the University of Texas because the
university considered race as a factor in admissions decisions. 76
Fisher, who is Caucasian, alleged that although she was qualified
for admission, minority students were admitted in preference to
her, in violation of the Equal Protection clause. The Fifth Circuit
held that the university’s procedure was constitutional. 77
On Fisher’s appeal to the Supreme Court, her summary of the
argument began this way: “If any state action should respect racial
equality, it is university admission. . . . Strict scrutiny thus
remains the rule, not the exception, when universities use race as
a factor in admissions decisions.”78 This opening introduces the
brief’s theme: that racial equality can be achieved only by
disregarding race, and that a university’s decisions involving race
70 See BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 224 (identifying the beginning of a
section as a place of the reader’s “peak attention”); CALLEROS, supra note 40,
at 217 (stating that “judges are strongly influenced by first impressions”);
LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 271
(5th ed. 2010) (stating that the beginning and end of a section are places of
greatest emphasis); Stanchi, supra note 6, at 333 (emphasizing the importance
of an introductory sentence).
71 ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 184.
72 Brief for Respondent at 13, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct.
2630 (2011) (No. 10–235).
73 Many judges dislike acronyms, which can make material difficult to
comprehend. Mark Cooney, Acronymonious, JUL. 2012 MICH. B.J. at 48, 48; see
also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 120 (advising lawyers to avoid
acronyms, especially unfamiliar ones).
74 See generally Bryan A. Garner, The Clear Opener, 100-AUG. A.B.A. J. 28
(advising judges on how to open a judicial opinion.)
75 See ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 185.
76 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411.
77 Id. at 2415. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir.
2011).
78 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345).
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should be measured strictly.
The University of Texas and others filed a responding brief
with Gregory Garre as counsel.79 His summary began by directly
countering the petitioner’s argument: “UT's individualized
consideration of race in holistic admissions did not subject
petitioner to unequal treatment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”80 Garre’s statement thus set up his theme: that it
was appropriate for the university to consider race as part of a
holistic approach.
Fisher’s arguments succeeded in persuading the Court to
remand the case to the Fifth Circuit to apply more exacting
scrutiny to the university’s procedures.81
Another equal protection challenge concerning university
procedures was brought in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action.82 At issue was a proposal adopted by Michigan
voters to ban consideration of race in university admissions. The
petitioner, who defended the proposal, began with an appeal to
logic:
Article 1, § 26 does not violate equal protection. A law that infringes
equal protection classifies a group and then treats that group
differently without adequate justification. But § 26 does not single
out groups for differing treatment; quite the opposite, it prohibits
public universities from classifying applicants by race or sex and
treating them differently.83

The respondent, by contrast, appealed to emotion by alluding
to the troubling history of slavery and its aftermath:
The Fourteenth Amendment promised the four million newly freed
slaves Equal Protection of Laws, including federal protection for
equality in the processes by which the states may enact new laws
and policies. That promise and almost all the promises of the
Fourteenth Amendment were, however, soon forgotten as this Court
79 Gregory Garre is recognized as a leading Supreme Court advocate.
Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First Century, 2
J. LEGAL METRICS 561, 570 (2013). Garre’s co-counsel included renowned
advocate Maureen Mahoney, see Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Female Advocates
before
the
Supreme
Court,
DAILYWRIT.com
(Apr.
30,
2012)
http://dailywrit.com/2012/04/top-female-advocates-before-the-supreme-court/,
and University of Virginia professor Douglas Laycock, see Univ. of Virginia
School
of
Law,
Faculty
page,
available
at
www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/faculty.nsf/FHPbI/2210483 (last visited Jun. 19,
2015).
80 Brief for Respondents at 18, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345).
81 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421-22. On remand, the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor
of the university. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir.
2014).
82 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623 (2014)
83 Brief for Petitioner at 12, Schuette, 134 S .Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12–682).
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and the nation ceded federal protection and allowed the southern
states in particular to deny equality altogether.84

The petitioner’s argument won when the Court decided that
the voters had the right to pass the proposal. 85
Hollingsworth v. Perry also concerned an equal protection
challenge, this time to a voter-approved proposition banning
marriage between persons of the same sex. 86 By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, California officials had decided not to
argue in favor of the proposition, so its private backers brought the
Supreme Court petition.87 A threshold question, then, was
whether the petitioners had standing to bring the case. 88 They
began their summary by directly confronting that problem: “1.
Petitioners do have standing to defend Proposition 8 in lieu of
public officials who have declined to do so.” 89 This straightforward
opening was necessary to confront an obstacle that ultimately
proved fatal to the petitioners’ side. 90
Theodore Olson91 and David Boies, who had been opposing
lawyers in the controversial Bush v. Gore case,92 represented the
respondents. They chose to begin their summary with a direct
reference to the equities of the case: “Proposition 8 is an arbitrary,
irrational, and discriminatory measure that denies gay men and
lesbians their fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”93 With this strong
language, Olson and Boies appealed to a sense of fairness,
effectively priming the justices to agree with their arguments.
They ultimately won when the Court held that the petitioners had
no standing to bring the case,94 thus leaving in place the district
court’s decision that the proposition was unconstitutional. 95
Eminent domain was the legal subject in Kelo v. City of New
London, where the petitioners opposed a local government’s taking

84 Brief on the Merits for Respondents at 17, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623
(2014) (No. 12–682). There were several respondents in the case; this article
focuses on the brief of the first named respondent, the Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality
By Any Means Necessary (BAMN).
85 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.
86 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
87 Id. at 2660.
88 Id. at 2661.
89 Brief of Petitioners at 12, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12–
144).
90 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660, 2668.
91 See Bhatia, supra note 79, at 570 (listing Olson among the top Supreme
Court advocates).
92 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
93 Brief for Respondents at 13, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12–144).
94 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
95 Id. at 2660.
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of private property for use by a commercial entity.96 Their
summary of the argument opened with an appeal to Americans’
emotional attachment to their homes: “To Petitioners, like most
Americans, their homes are their castles.” 97 The brevity of this
sentence intensifies its impact.98
The respondents’ summary evoked logic rather than emotion:
“At the heart of this case are a series of decisions made by the
Connecticut legislature and the elected officials of the City of New
London as to what will best serve the economic, social, structural
and environmental interests of New London's citizens.”99
These sentences primed the Court for two contrasting
approaches to the case. The petitioners tapped into deep-seated
feelings about homes. By contrast, the respondents relied on legal
principles, telling a “‘justice’ story” 100 to argue that the city’s
decision was correct despite an outcome displeasing to some.
In Kelo, the justice story prevailed when the Court approved
the city’s exercise of eminent domain.101
A police search was the subject of Kyllo v. United States.102
Kyllo had been convicted of manufacturing marijuana after the
police used a heat-seeking device to gather information about
activities inside his home. Kyllo’s summary of the argument began
this way: “The text of the Fourth Amendment expressly provides
for protection of the home against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”103 The summary in the brief for the United States, by
Seth Waxman,104 began, “The use of the thermal imager in this
case was not a Fourth Amendment search.”105
Again, these opening sentences employed contrasting
approaches. The petitioner evoked emotions about the home, while
the respondent relied on a logical argument—that using a heatseeking device is not a search at all.106
The Court ultimately held that using the heat-seeking device

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Brief for Petitioners at 9, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04–108).
98 See BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 224 (stating that a short sentence can
create emphasis).
99 Brief for Respondents at 11, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04–108).
100 See Stanchi, supra note 6, at 330 (explaining the concept of a “justice
story,” whereby a defendant can assert that although bad things have
happened, justice has already been reached).
101 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490.
102 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
103 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99–8508).
104 See Bhatia, supra note 79, at 570 (listing then-Solicitor General
Waxman as one of the top Supreme Court advocates).
105 Brief for the United States at 10, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99–
8508).
106 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that use of the device did constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
96
97
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did amount to an unlawful search. 107
Displays of the Ten Commandments on government property
were challenged in two cases handed down on the same day,
McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky108 and Van Orden v. Perry.109 The McCreary County
petitioners defended their displays by opening with a succinct
reference to legal principles: “The Foundations Display passes
every test developed by this Court.”110
The respondents objected to the displays in more emotional
language: “Three times in a little more than a year, Pulaski and
McCreary counties, Kentucky, erected Ten Commandments
displays in highly visible locations in their county courthouses.”111
The reader can almost hear the advocate’s exasperation at these
repeated attempts. His side won; the Court held that the Kentucky
displays violated the Establishment Clause. 112
In Van Orden, the petitioners, who opposed the Ten
Commandments display,113 appealed to emotions against the
establishment of religion: “At the very seat of Texas government,
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court, is
a large monument quoting a famous passage of religious scripture
taken, almost verbatim, from the King James Bible.”114
Defending the display, the respondent also evoked emotion by
citing Texas tradition: “For over four decades, a granite monument
depicting the Ten Commandments has stood on the Texas Capitol
Grounds. Defined by statute as a ‘museum’ and maintained by a
professional curator, the Grounds feature seventeen different
monuments to people, events, and ideals that have contributed to
the diversity, culture, and history of Texas.”115
In contrast to its holding about the Kentucky displays, the
Court held that the Texas display was constitutional, finding it an
appropriate acknowledgement of the Ten Commandments’ role in
the nation’s history.116
McCutcheon v. FEC117 concerned limits on the amount of

533 U.S. at 40.
McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
109 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
110 Brief for Petitioners at 5, McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03–
1693).
111 Brief for Respondents at 7, McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No.
03–1693).
112 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881.
113 Counsel of record for the petitioner was then-professor Erwin
Chemerinsky, now dean of the University of California at Irvine Law School.
See www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/chemerinsky.
114 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 03-1500).
115 Brief for Respondent at 8, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 031500).
116 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
117 McCutcheon v. F.E.C., 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
107
108
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political contributions made by corporations. The appellant’s 118
summary of the argument began with a direct statement that the
limit was unconstitutional: “BCRA’s aggregate contribution limits
impose an unconstitutional burden on core First Amendment
activity.”119 This sentence appeals to logic, but it lacks spark,
partly because it begins with a lifeless acronym.120
The appellee’s summary121 also began dryly, with a
cumbersome citation:122 “In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), this Court upheld Congress's authority to impose
aggregate limits on individual political contributions in order to
prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to
particular candidates, parties, and political committees.”123
The appellant’s arguments prevailed when the Court held
that the limit on contributions was unconstitutional.124
United States v. Stevens involved a defendant who was
convicted of violating a statute banning depictions of animal
cruelty.125 The lawyers for both sides had to decide how to deal
with potentially strong reactions aroused by harm to animals.
Elena Kagan,126 then serving as the Solicitor General, was counsel
of record on the brief for the United States, which supported the
statute. In the first line of her summary, she chose to maintain a
measured tone while still mentioning animal cruelty: “Section 48’s
prohibition of the commercial trade in depictions of the illegal
torture and killing of animals is constitutional.”127
Patricia Millett,128 counsel for the respondent, attempted to
diffuse any strong emotions against her client by beginning this
118 The party was an “appellant” rather than “petitioner” because the case
was an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Id. at 1444.
119 Brief for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon at 17, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct.
1434 (2014) (No. 12–536).
120 See Cooney, supra note 73, at 48 (explaining that many judges dislike
acronyms).
121 See Bhatia, supra note 79, at 570 (listing Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., then
the Solicitor General, as a top Supreme Court advocate).
122 Many commentators believe a citation clutters the beginning of a
sentence, detracting from the writer’s point. E.g., BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at
128.
123 Brief for the Appellee at 16, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No.
12–536).
124 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
125 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 466-67 (2010).
126 Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, in her former role as an advocate,
has been listed as one of the nation’s top advocates. GUBERMAN, supra note 37,
at 323.
127 Brief for the United States at 7, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08–
769).
128 See Bhatia, supra note 79, at 570 (listing Millett among top Supreme
Court advocates). Patricia Millett s now a judge on the D.C. Circuit. United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, http://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+PAM (last
visited Jun. 19, 2015).
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way: “This case is not about dogfighting or animal cruelty. The
government and Stevens stand together opposing that.”129 She
then steered her summary to a constitutional argument—that the
statute violated her client’s right to free speech. She won the
case.130
The separation of church and state was at issue in Town of
Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway.131 The town had regularly invited local
clergymen to open its meetings with prayers, most of which were
explicitly Christian.132 The respondents were citizens who
attended town meetings and objected that by including mostly
Christian prayers, the town’s practice violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.133
The opening of the petitioner’s summary of the argument
evoked feelings about the nation’s traditions: “Legislative prayer is
a firmly embedded practice in this Nation, long exercised by
deliberative public bodies at the federal, state, and local levels to
solemnize the proceedings of lawmaking institutions.”134
The respondents’ summary opened with an appeal to logic
and the law, with an undercurrent of emotion about religious
coercion. It began, “Petitioner's prayer practice is unconstitutional
for two independent but mutually reinforcing reasons. It puts
coercive pressure on citizens to participate in the prayers, and
those prayers are sectarian rather than inclusive.”135 This opening
repeats the substance of two of the brief’s major point headings, 136
and thus provides an overview of the brief.
The Court held for the town, deciding that the prayer practice
was constitutional.137
The above summaries illustrate lawyers’ varied approaches to
framing the summary of the argument section and suggest that
counsel’s choices about crafting it will depend on an assessment of
the particular case. For example, in Stevens, Patricia Millett chose
to begin her summary with an appeal to logic in order to deflect
attention from her client’s connection with harm to animals. By
contrast, in Hollingsworth, Theodore Olson and David Boies began
by drawing on the equities surrounding the issue of same-sex
marriage. Each of those briefs was on the winning side.

Brief for Respondent at 11, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08–769).
See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (holding the statute overbroad and thus
invalid under the First Amendment).
131 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).
132 Id. at 1816–17.
133 Id. at 1817.
134 Brief for Petitioner at 12, Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12–
696).
135 Brief for Respondents at 17, Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12–
696).
136 Id. at ii–iii.
137 Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1828.
129
130
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C. The Endings
In addition to the opening of a piece of discourse, the ending is
another key position of emphasis. 138 A striking conclusion to the
summary of the argument can favorably dispose the court toward
the writer’s side. In the examples below, the lawyers wrote
endings calculated to leave vivid impressions with the Court.
The summaries of the argument in the McCreary County case
illustrate how lawyers can stake out their positions with
compelling endings. The Petitioners, arguing that the Kentucky
Ten Commandments display was constitutional, ended their
summary this way: “At any rate, the Display passes every test,
including all aspects of Justice O'Connor's proposed test. Whatever
the test, it should respect our religious heritage by distinguishing
between real establishments and permissible acknowledgments of
religion.”139 The respondents ended by arguing that the
petitioners’ motivation “lacks any secular purpose and conveys the
Counties' message that it endorses that religious message.”140 Both
sides appealed to logic and the law in forceful sentences.
A particularly pointed ending appeared in the petitioners’
summary in the Kelo case: “Government may pursue tax revenue
and economic development, and corporations may pursue profits,
but not at the expense of constitutional rights.”141 And in United
States v. Stevens, Patricia Millett wrote a compelling ending to her
summary. Arguing that a statute banning depictions of animal
cruelty would not “dry up” a business, she directed the focus to
free speech: “In short, the only thing Section 48 dries up is
protected speech about an important issue–or at least one
perspective on that debate.”142 The brevity of these ending
sentences enhanced their impact.
Theodore Olson concluded his Hollingsworth summary by
arguing, “Because a ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest,’ Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (internal quotation marks
omitted;
alteration
in
original),
Proposition
8
is
unconstitutional.”143 While the lengthy citation and complicated
syntax distract somewhat from the sentence’s flair, its argument
about disfavored groups is a strong one. Olson won on procedural

138
139

1693).

BEAZLEY, supra note 13, at 223; Stanchi, supra note 6, at 347.
Brief for Petitioners at 7, McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03–

140 Brief for Respondents at 10, McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No.
03–1693).
141 Brief for Petitioners at 11, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04–108).
142 Brief for Respondent at 13, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08–769).
143 Brief for Respondents at 16, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12–144).
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grounds.144
Gregory Garre’s summary in the Fisher case ends with this
language: “Abruptly reversing course here would upset legitimate
expectations in the rule of law—not to mention the profoundly
important societal interests in ensuring that the future leaders of
America are trained in a campus environment in which they are
exposed to the full educational benefits of diversity.”145 At fortyseven words, this sentence is rather long, but Garre effectively
used a dash146 to break it up and craft a forceful ending.
The Galloway respondent’s summary ends with powerful
wording about mixing church and state: “[The town’s] position is
irreconcilable with this Court's decisions and with any reasonable
conception of religious liberty or freedom of conscience.”147
Each of these lawyers chose vivid wording and compelling
content to deliver an ending with punch.

IV. CONCLUSION
Writing a summary of the argument is an art, not a science.
Except on a few matters like word count and numbers of citations,
mathematical computations will not shed light on how to frame
the summary. Even noting whether a particular summary was on
the winning side is not a fair measure of its merit, because a case’s
outcome is influenced by many other factors, including the state of
the law, the record from the courts below, and judges’
predispositions.
But art can be observed and appreciated. The examples in
this article show how a summary of the argument with some
panache can grab a court’s attention. Lifeless wording and
cumbersome citations can fall flat, but vibrant language, attention
to sentence structure, and a deft appeal to emotion or logic can
pique a judge’s interest at the outset of a brief.

Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660, 2668.
Brief for Respondents at 22, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–345).
146 See GUBERMAN, supra note 37, at 259 (recommending the dash to
emphasize a point).
147 Brief of Respondents at 20, Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12–
696).
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